This paper examines a recent debate in the literature on power indices in which classical measures such as the Banzhaf, Shapley-Shubik, and Public Good indices have been criticized on the grounds that they do not take into account player preferences. It has been argued that an index that is blind to preferences misses a vital component of power, namely strategic interaction. In this vein, there has been an attempt to develop so-called strategic power indices on the basis of non-cooperative game theory. We argue that the criticism is unfounded and that a preference-based power index is incompatible with the definition of power as a generic ability: 'the ability to affect outcomes'. We claim that power resides in, and only in, a game form and not in a game itself.
Introduction
In recent years, it has become customary to say that classical power indices, such as the Shapley-Shubik and the Banzhaf indices, suffer a major drawback in that they do not take into account player preferences. Particularly sharp criticism has come from Tsebelis and Garrett (1996) , Garrett and Tsebelis (1996 , 1999a , b, 2001 , and Steunenberg et al. (1999) , while a more conciliatory critique has been penned by Napel and Widgre´n (2001 . 1 The corollary of this 'lack of preferences' criticism is that classical power indices -because they are based on simple games which are rooted in cooperative game theory and not in non-cooperative game theory -are insensitive to the strategic aspects of power and, therefore, are inappropriate for a positive analysis of the distribution of power in institutional structures. The upshot of the criticism has been the development of so-called 'strategic' power indices based on non-cooperative games as a way to fill this apparent lacuna (Steunenberg et al., 1999) as well as renewed attempts to introduce preferences or strategic considerations into the classical indices (Hosli, 1997 (Hosli, , 2002 Widgre´n, 2001, 2002) and even attempts to find a unified framework that brings together cooperative and non-cooperative approaches (Napel and Widgre´n, 2002) . Another strand of the debate initiated by de Swart (2002, 2003) has been to examine and develop a little known index known as the Hoede-Bakker index (Hoede and Bakker, 1982) that is similar to the classical indices but purportedly takes into account player inclinations.
The aim of this essay is to explore this 'absence of preference' criticism and examine the following question: is it conceptually meaningful for any measure of power -not just voting power -to include the preferences of the player whose power is being measured? The question is fundamental and any serious conceptual or applied analysis of power must explicitly or implicitly deal with the role of preferences in power relations.
Although there have been a number of studies that touch upon the role of preferences within the context of voting power indices, 2 a perusal of the literature suggests that there is no equivalent study that singularly focuses on the problem and pushes the analysis as far as we attempt to do so here. Thus, while making liberal use of the philosophical semantic analysis of power conducted, in particular, by Goldman (1972 Goldman ( , 1974 and Morriss (1987 Morriss ( /2002 , we will do more in this essay than just restate their respective positions. We will actually sharpen some of their original insights and express them more forcefully within the context of study of power indices. In particular, we express our main result that the basic concept of power as a potential or capacity cannot accommodate the preferences of the players whose power we are measuring in what we, with an intended abuse of terminology, loosely christen as the 'Core Theorem of the Measurement of Power'. 3 As the title of our essay suggests, we like to think of our Core Theorem -which is not a theorem in the formal sense of the term -as a kind of conceptual impossibility result that is germane to the theory of power generally.
The corollary of our theorem states that a player's power resides in, and only in, the strategies available to her given by the game form and not in the way that she plays the game. This implies that power is a valueindependent concept. The upshot is that the Core Theorem renders unintelligible any attempt to formulate a measure of power in terms of the equilibrium of a non-cooperative game -the very idea of strategic power indices. Put bluntly, assessing how a player may play a game does not help us answer such questions as 'Is Smith more powerful than Jones?' or 'What is the extent of Smith's power?' because power concerns what players may be able to do, not the actions they may or do take. It must not, therefore, be thought that we are rehashing old philosophical debates. Rather, we are bringing the semantics of power into the centre of the debate about how to measure power. The fact that there seems to be a quite widespread belief about the need to develop preference-based measures of power indicates that there is still a general confusion regarding the nature of a power ascription. 4 This calls for an awareness of a philosophical analysis and not simply more formal modelling.
The remainder of this article is in six sections. In the next section, we briefly recap the definition of a power index which forms the source of the controversy that we examine. In the third section, we set out the argument in favour of developing a preference-based power index by recourse to two examples. In the fourth section, we lay out the meaning of a generic power ascription. The fifth section is the heart of the essay. Here we state and defend our Core Theorem. In the sixth section, we discuss the 'power to'-'power over' distinction. Section 7 concludes.
Power Indices
A power index assigns to each player of an n-person simple game -a game in which each coalition that might form is either all powerful (winning) or completely ineffectual (losing) -a non-negative real number which purportedly indicates a player's ability to determine the outcome of the game. This ability is a player's power in a game given the rules of the game.
Let N ¼ f1; 2; . . . ; ng be the set of players. The power set }ðNÞ is the set of logically possible coalitions. The simple game is characterized by the set WðÞ }ðNÞ of winning coalitions. WðÞ satisfies ; 6 2 WðÞ; N 2 WðÞ; and if S 2 WðÞ and S T, then T 2 WðÞ. In other words, can be represented as a pair ðN; WÞ. It should be noted that can also be described by a characteristic function, : }ðnÞ ! f0; 1g with ðS Þ ¼ 1 if and only if S 2 W and 0 otherwise.
Weighted voting games are a special sub-class of simple games characterized by a non-negative real vector ðw 1 ; w 2 ; . . . ; w n Þ where w i represents player i 's voting weight and a quota of votes necessary to establish a winning coalition. We call this quota a decision rule, d, such that 0 < d P i 2 N w i . A weighted voting game is represented by ½d; w 1 ; w 2 ; . . . ; w n .
A power ascription in a simple game is given whenever a player i has the ability to change the outcome of a play of the game. A player i who, by leaving a winning coalition S 2 WðÞ turns it into a losing coalition S nfi g 6 2 WðÞ has a swing in S and is called a decisive member of S. Coalitions where i has a swing are called critical coalitions with respect to i. A concise description of can be given by a set MðÞ, which is the set of all S 2 WðÞ but no subset of S is in WðÞ, i.e. all members of S are critical. We call such a coalition a minimal winning coalition (MWC). Further, we denote by i the number of swings of player i in a game . A player i for which i ðÞ ¼ 0 is called a dummy (or null player) in , i.e. it is never the case that i can turn a winning coalition into a losing coalition (it is easy to see that i is a dummy if and only if it is never a member of an MWC; and i is a dictator if fi g is the sole MWC).
Numerous power indices based upon the framework of a simple game have been proposed down the years, notably by Penrose (1946) , Shapley and Shubik (1954) , Banzhaf (1965) , Coleman (1971) , Deegan and Packel (1978) , Johnston (1978), and Holler (1982) . For illustrative purposes, the ShapleyShubik index, which is a special case of the Shapley value for cooperative games (Shapley, 1953) , measures power as the relative share of pivotal ('swing') positions of a player i in a simple game . It is assumed that all orderings of players are equally probable. The idea (or 'story') is that the players line up to vote 'yes' and the player that turns a losing coalition into a winning coalition is the pivot ('swing'). It is given by
In contrast, the absolute Banzhaf index for a player i in a game measures the frequency in which player i is a decisive member of a coalition, i.e. the ratio of the number of swings to the number of coalitions in which i is a member: Holler's (1982) Public Good Index (PGI) measures the share of swings in MWCs. The motivation for this index is that if the outcome of the vote is a public good, then this fact together with rationality of the players means that only MWCs should be taken into account (oversized coalitions include freeriders and will only form by chance). The PGI is given by
Feasible Coalitions and Credible Swings
The apparent shortcoming of a classical power index is that because the underlying framework of a simple game only classifies the subsets of players (coalitions) into 'winning' and 'losing', such an index is insensitive to the strategic aspects of power relations. This can be captured by two elementary examples that have been discussed in the recent literature.
Example 3.1. Consider the three player simple game with winning coalitions fa; b; cg, fa; bg, and fa; cg. Assume, as Widgre´n (2001, 2002) do, that a is in a position to make an ultimatum offer to either player b or c: accept almost no share of the spoils or be prevented from taking part in a winning coalition. Player a could be the federal government that requires the approval from one of two provincial governments to pass laws; or a could be a major shareholder that requires the support of a minority shareholder in order to determine corporate policy. If the players are rational and have utility functions that are monotonic in the spoils and that there is no way to credibly enforce a blocking coalition fb; cg which could extract concessions from a, then the non-cooperative game theoretic equilibrium will be that whichever of players b or c that a approaches first will accept a's pittance of an offer. Something, however small, is, after all, better than nothing for homo oeconomicus. Drawing on cooperative game theory, Napel and Widgre´n further point out that the core of this game is fð1; 0; 0Þg. The conclusion that Napel and Widgre´n come to is that given the pittance or nothing at all b or c will receive under these two solution concepts, it is only reasonable to deduce that they must be more or less powerless because both of these players are robbed of the power commonly associated with their swing. In contrast, the absolute Banzhaf index, the Shapley-Shubik index, and the PGI, for instance, yield power vectors of ð Example 3.2. Consider a committee of seven players, N ¼ fa; b; c; d; e; f; gg in which each member has one vote and a 5/7 majority rule. Assume a preference configuration abcdefg which ranks the players in a unidimensional policy space according to their ideal points. Suppose there is a proposal located between e and f but which is closer to e than f and suppose further that the status quo q is located to the left of a (see Figure 1 ). Now the question is as follows: given the spatial configuration, what are the possible outcomes of this voting game? Take the spatial MWCs S 1 ¼ fa; b; c; d; eg, S 2 ¼ fb; c; d; e; f g and S 3 ¼ fc; d; e; f; gg. Inspection of S 1 indicates that it cannot be an MWC in a spatial sense because given the locational assumptions, if the players in S 1 accept the proposal, then so too will players f and g: if a finds acceptable, then any player more in the vicinity of than a will do so as well. Now consider S 2 . By the same argument, S 2 is also not a spatial MWC because b accepting implies that g will accept it. The third case, S 3 , is a spatial MWC. What this reasoning implies for the measurement of power is twofold. Firstly, it says that certain coalitions will not form, namely S 1 and S 2 , and, consequently, these should be ignored in calculating the power of a player. Secondly, not every swing in a spatial MWC should be taken into account in a (descriptive) measure of power. In coalition S 3 , only c's swing should count because c is the only player that can apparently make a credible threat to actually exercise the choice of leaving the coalition (causing it to become a losing one). The argument is that because c's position is equidistant between q and , c is indifferent as to whether q or prevails. Note, that if q would happen to be a little more to the right, then even the credibility of c's swing could be doubted as it prefers to q.
Both examples deal with one and the same fundamental issue: not all coalitions are rationally feasible (although they are logically possible); and not every swing is 'credible', i.e. will be exercised by a rational agent. Why, the argument runs, consider states of the world which will not occur when analyzing power relations and measuring a player's power? Surely, a descriptive measure of power must filter the set of logically possible coalitions and swings for their feasibility and credibility. That is, because real players are generally faced by choices and seek to maximize their utility, coalitionsto borrow Garrett and Tsebelis' (1996: 278) similitude -'do not form like a motion of gas molecules in a container'. If players b and c in Example 3.1 both stand to lose by rejecting a's overture, why should we account for the 142 JOURNAL OF THEORETICAL POLITICS 17(1) Figure 1 power denoted by their swing in either fa; bg or fa; cg? By the same token, in Example 3.2, we should not only ignore the swings of d; e; f, and g in S 3 , we should even ignore the swings of the players in S 1 and S 2 because these coalitions, while logically possible, are not what Rescher (1975: 146) would call 'genuine or real possibilities'. A valid descriptive measure of power must, therefore, make reference to the preferences of the player whose power we wish to measure. Various proposals for a strategic or non-cooperative power index have been put forward, as noted earlier, by Tsebelis and Garrett (1996) , Tsebelis (1999a, b, 2001 ), Steunenberg et al. (1999) , and Napel and Widgre´n (2001 . For our purposes, however, we need not concern ourselves with a presentation and discussion of the technical details of these indices because we actually want to take issue not with how one should incorporate preferences of player i in a measure of i's power but if we should do so at all. It is sufficient to say that the basic intuition of a strategic power index is that the power index value assigned to a player should be related to how that player values the outcomes. In the case of Steunenberg et al. (1999) , this is measured in terms of the proximity of the equilibrium outcome to a player's ideal point, while, in Widgre´n (2002, 2004) , strategic power is taken, loosely speaking, as the expected contribution of a player to the equilibrium outcome.
Generic Ability: The Fixed Core of Meaning
Despite the intuitive appeal of the criticism encapsulated in Examples 3.1 and 3.2, it is fundamentally mistaken. The reason hinges on a conceptual issue: what we mean by a power ascription.
Ordinarily speaking, a 'power' ascription refers to a person's ability: what a person is able to do. 5 In the game theoretic context that we are discussing, the ability in question is to effect outcomes (i.e. 'force' or 'determine' outcomes) of the game. That is, a player has a strategy which, if chosen, will make a decisive difference to the outcome. This basic definition is the same for a power index based upon a simple game and one that is ostensibly based upon a non-cooperative game. The difference lies in the specification of the ability. In a simple game, the ability is turning a winning coalition into a losing coalition or vice versa, thereby being decisive for the acceptance or rejection of a bill, while, in a non-cooperative game, the ability is specified in terms of shifting the equilibrium in one's own favour.
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5. See, in particular, Goldman (1970 Goldman ( , 1972 , Harre´(1970) , and Morriss (1987 Morriss ( /2002 .
Here lies the heart of the problem. The intuition behind applying noncooperative games to the analysis of power is that if a player i is able to determine the outcome of a game but only by playing a dominated strategy, i.e. playing a strategy that is not a best reply to any other, it makes no sense to ascribe 'power' to this player for this ability. In other words, if a player can change the outcome only by doing something that he or she would never rationally choose to do, it is equivalent to saying that the player cannot determine the outcome with that strategy. Ergo, the player is powerless for this scenario. This is exactly what is hinted at in Examples 3.1 and 3.2. Our claim, which we will now elaborate, is that this last conclusion is false, given what we customarily mean by 'ability'. And if that is the case, then the preference-based power of player i is an unintelligible concept.
To explain the problem, we can, without loss of generality, reduce our analysis in the first instance to the one-person case. Consider a player i who has a set of actions or strategies A i ¼ fa 1 ; a 2 g which is mapped onto a set of outcomes X ¼ fx 1 ; x 2 g such that if i chooses a 1 ; x 1 is the outcome; and if i chooses a 2 ; x 2 is the outcome. In keeping with the standard assumptions of game theory, i is free to choose any element of A i , i.e. i is not unfree to choose either a 1 or, a 2 . This structure is what is meant by a game form (which is a game in which the utility functions (preferences) of the players remain unassigned). 6 Now, in this game form, we can observe two 'abilities'. The first is that i is able to choose an element of A i . This is simply the trivial fact that the elements of the action set are feasible. The second, and more relevant, 'ability' is that by choosing an element of A i , i is able to determine or force the outcome. Thus, we can say that it is within i 's power to see to it whether x 1 or x 2 occurs; or i possess power with respect to x 1 and x 2 . That is, by having available a strategy which can effect an outcome, we should ascribe power to i. Conversely, if a player does not possess a strategy that effects an outcome, then that player has no power (is powerless).
This account of power in terms of a one-person game form could be slated on the grounds that, as a social concept, power clearly has more to it than an actor just being able to do what he chooses to do (i seeing to it whether x 1 or x 2 occurs). In a strategic context, the result of adopting a particular strategy may also depend on what the others can do. What Robinson could do on his metaphorical desert island may have depended upon Friday's choices. 144 JOURNAL OF THEORETICAL POLITICS 17 (1) 6. A game form g consists of four main features: a set of players N, a set of actions or strategies A i , for each player i 2 N, a set X of feasible outcomes, and an outcome function that yields some single outcome x for any given n-tuple ½a i of strategies, one strategy a i 2 A i for each player i. That is, g ¼ ðN; fA i g i 2 N ; Þ. See Gibbard (1973) .
It would be mistaken, however, to believe that strategic interaction qualitatively affects the meaning of power as 'an ability to effect outcomes'. Strategic interaction only means that the sets of outcomes that a player can effect may not be singletons (i.e. one-member subsets of the outcome set X ). All that matters is that the set of outcomes that a player's strategies can effect different subsets of X. There is nothing in the meaning of 'ability' or power that says that a player must be able to realize specific elements of X to have power. Only a dictator can guarantee this; and one can have power without being 'all powerful'. For a player to be ascribed power, it is sufficient that the state of the world would be different in the absence of that player's intervention. The spirit of a power ascription is, then, as follows. If player i wanted a particular outcome or set of outcomes and that i has an action (or sequence of actions) such that the performance of these actions under stated or implied conditions will result in that outcome or set of outcomes and would not result if i would not perform this action (or sequence of actions), then player i would perform this action (or sequence of actions) and the specified outcome or set of outcomes would obtain. That is, i is essential or non-redundant for an outcome or set of outcomes.
8 When we ascribe power to a player we are, therefore, (1) making a claim about what a player is able to do under specified conditions irrespective of the occurrence of these conditions; and, thus, (2) describing a capacity or potential of a player, i.e. what a player could do if the specified conditions were manifest.
Power in this 'general sense' of the term is, to deploy Morriss' (1987 Morriss' ( /2002 ) terminology, a generic ability because it involves a capacity to do things that have an effect. This notion of a generic ability is what we take to be the natural 'fixed core of meaning' of power.
There are three important properties of power as a generic ability that we need to be cognisant of and which essentially rule out the inclusion of i 's preferences in a measure of i 's power. Firstly, a power ascription is indelibly categorical: it is 'like a promissory note, we need only believe that it is not [logically] impossible for it to be cashed' (Harre´, 1970: 91) . Secondly, the subjunctive nature of a power ascription leaves the matter of what i wants undefined. And thirdly, a power ascription does not say how much power i has, only that there exist circumstances in which i is non-redundant for the BRAHAM & HOLLER: PREFERENCE-BASED POWER INDEX 145 7. The basic formal tools for analyzing the power of players in game forms are known as effectivity functions. See Peleg (1984) and Moulin (1983) . Vannucci is an accessible formal review (2002).
8. Note that this corresponds to the definition of a swing in a simple game. See Section 1. This framework is also used by Goldman (1974) in his analysis of the Shapley-Shubik index.
outcome; a measure of power -a power index -aggregates these ascriptions of non-redundancy in some way. 
The Core Theorem
Now, the central claim of this essay, which we have outlined in the introduction, is as follows.
CORE THEOREM OF THE MEASUREMENT OF POWER: If power is the ability of i to affect an outcome, then a measure of i's power must exclude any reference to i's preference (behavioural content) with respect to affecting that outcome.
There are three basic reasons for excluding i 's preferences in a measure of i 's power, when taken as a generic ability. These are:
(1) being disinclined to do something does not imply the inability to do it; (2) psychological states such as desires and wants are not normally applied to the concept of ability; and (3) the exercise of an ability is not to be conflated with its possession.
Disinclination and Inability
The definitional framework of a game form may appear somewhat trivial but its implications for the notion of preference-based power are not. Assume that i has a preference relation on X, i.e. i might prefer one outcome to the other or be indifferent between them, i.e. we have a game. How will this shape i 's ability to effect an outcome?
For the sake of simplicity and, as we have indicated earlier, without loss of generality, let us return to our one-player case. Let us say that our player i is a lonesome Robinson on his desert island. He is fortunate enough to have available two possibilities to entertain himself between fishing and collecting coconuts: he can either read the e-book version of Treasure Island (outcome x 1 ) or watch the Parsifal DVD (outcome x 2 ) on his solarpower notebook that, by some good fortune, he has with him and that is still fully functional. Robinson definitely prefers the peace of reading Stevenson under the shady palms than suffering the musical torments of Wagner -it was not him who had actually packed the DVD in the notebook in the first place. The question to be answered is: in what way does 146 JOURNAL OF THEORETICAL POLITICS 17 (1) 9. It might be objected at this point that we have ignored the 'power to'-'power over' distinction in our analysis. For the sake of continuity of argument, we deal with this in Section 5.
Robinson's preference for reading Stevenson (x 1 ) make him able to perform those actions that result in him reading Stevenson (a 1 ) but unable to perform those actions (a 2 ) that result in him watching Wagner? The question may appear to be a little odd but it is one of the central conceptual issues that a preference-based power index must confront but also one that has up to now been ignored. Recall Example 3.1. In their discussion of this case, Widgre´n (2001, 2002) claim that players b and c are 'robbed of their swing'.
10 That is, b and c are effectively unable to choose an element of their strategy set, in this case leaving a coalition with a and forming a blocking coalition fb; cg, because they prefer a pittance of payoff to none at all. It is this fact that effectively makes these players dummies.
11
The same problem holds for all bar c in the MWC fc; d; e; f; gg in Example 3.2: because all are better off under the proposal than under the status quo q, they are all effectively unable to change the outcome and, therefore, have no power in this scenario.
In order to find an answer to our question, let us take a step back and ask ourselves how the non-performance of an action can be explained. As far as we can determine, and here we follow the philosophical literature on possibility and counterfactuals, the non-performance of an act may have resulted from two quite distinct factors: either (1) our inability to do so; or (2) our disinclination to do so. 12 While for (1) we can say that there are prior conditions that necessitated that we are unable to perform an action -it was made impossible -and, therefore, cannot be an element of A i (because A i is the set of possible actions), this is not so for (2). Even though there may exist prior conditions that necessitate our being disinclined to perform an action -it is too painful -and, therefore, 'necessitate' that we do not undertake the action, it does not follow that we are unable to do so. To put it bluntly, if it is not impossible for i to perform, say a 2 , and i either would never conceivably perform a 2 because i prefers a 1 or is observed not to have performed a 2 , it is not because i is unable to perform a 2 but because i does or did not want to.
Let us return to Robinson on his lonesome desert island. If Robinson does not watch Wagner because it is too gloomy and prefers to read Stevenson instead, surely it is absurd to conclude that that he is unable to watch Wagner. Given that Robinson's notebook computer and the requisite programs are in working order, that the DVD disc is present, that Robinson
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10. In Napel and Widgre´n's (2004: 23) , this is rephrased as a player 'having a swing that matters to the outcome'.
11. Actually Napel and Widgre´n classify them as inferior players, which are players who have swing but are as effective as a dummy.
12. The literature on possibility and counterfactuals is vast. Here we follow both Goldman (1970) and Rescher (1975) . knows how to operate the computer and its programs, etc., it follows that Robinson is able to watch Wagner by performing the requisite actions. That fact that he will not or ultimately does not perform these actions in no way vitiates his ability to do so. Moreover, even if Robinson's not watching Wagner is necessitated by prior events, for instance an aversion to Wagner because it reminds him of his father and Robinson suffers an Oedipal complex, there is still no reason for saying that he is unable to watch Wagner.
In other words, and following Goldman (1970: 198-9) , we take the necessary and sufficient condition for ascribing an ability to perform an action (choose a strategy in game theoretic terms) to be that the action is possible (not impossible). Taking into account i 's preference in a measure of i 's power violates this condition for ascribing power by conflating disinclination with inability.
Phobias and Strategies
Although we believe that the fact that a preference-based power ascription conflates a disinclination with inability is sufficient to rule out a preference-based power index, we have to deal with a subtle argument that could be thought of as a way around this problem. In his analysis of the term 'ability', Goldman points out that some may consider the 'possibility criterion' as too weak for a reasonable power ascription. Taking our Robinson Crusoe example as a starting point, some theorists might say that the fact that a 2 is possible (not impossible) does not really entail that i is able to perform it. Instead, it might be contended -and this seems to be what a preferencebased power index is getting at -i must also want or have an inclination to choose a 2 , however remote that want or inclination may be. 13 In Example 3.1, players b and c are 'robbed of their swing' precisely because as members of the species homo oeconomicus, they will never have the inclination to reject a's offer. For Robinson to really be able to see to it that he watches Wagnerperform those acts which result in him sitting in front of his notebook computer and the DVD spinning away -he must either have some desire to watch Wagner or at least be able to want to watch Wagner. The idea is that if, as homo oeconomicus, b and c are unable to want naught instead of an epsilon of payoff, why attribute to them the power to reject a's offer? Similarly, if, due to his Oedipal complex, Robinson is unable to want to watch Wagner because doing so will generate memories of his father and any memory of 148 JOURNAL OF THEORETICAL POLITICS 17 (1) 13. Napel and Widgre´n (2002: 336) , for instance, write 'for a player to be truly powerful, his preferences should matter in terms of outcome, i.e. a small change in preferences should lead to a small change in outcome'. his father will so psychologically incapacitate him to the degree that he cannot even collect coconuts and fresh water so he will die of starvation thirst and, like any living being, Robinson is genetically programmed to try and survive, then why attribute to him the power to see to it that he watches Wagner instead of reading Stevenson?
The straightforward answer to these questions is simply that power ought to be attributed because the concept of ability is not ordinarily applied to psychological and behavioural states such as wants, desires, or preferences.
The obvious counterargument from adherents to preference-based power would be to say that just because the concept of ability is not ordinarily applied to behavioural states does not imply that it cannot be done. One could, of course, try to introduce a notion of ability that encompasses wants in order to conceptually shore up a preference-based power index. However, as we will easily demonstrate, the most that such a notion can do is to play a role in defining the game form: it plays no role in analyzing the game form or game itself and, therefore, it can only affect a power ascription in an indirect way.
What, then, does it mean to say that a person is 'unable to want to do something'? As far as we can make out, it refers to the extreme case of a person having a phobia; i.e. having an abnormal or morbid fear or aversion to some action or experience such that the performance of the action or undergoing the experience is, in a very significant and psychological sense, impossible; i.e. the phobia means that the person can under no circumstance voluntarily choose the action or experience. Or, put another way, the person's constitution predisposes them to be unfree to select a particular action from their act repertoire or choose a particular experience even though that act or experience is, for all intents and purposes, perfectly feasible.
It should be clear that a 'phobiafied' strategy brings us face-to-face with a basic inconsistency in a game theoretic analysis of power and one that has not yet been acknowledged by the preference-based power theorists. Such a strategy cannot be considered as a strategy at all. Recall that we said that the standard assumption of a game form is that i is free (not unfree) to choose any element of the strategy set, A i . If it really is the case that i is free to choose any element of A i , it would seem correct to say that it is possible (not impossible) for i to choose any element of A i . If it were not the case, we could not say that i is free to choose any element of A i . In which case, if we want to maintain the assumption of a game form that i is free to choose any element of A i , we would actually have to eliminate the impossible strategy from A i with the upshot that we have actually redefined the game form. By consequence, if i is unable to want to do or experience something, then we are forced to remove the relevant strategy from A i . At most it appears that the notion of ability that encompasses wants can be used to define a game form and, therefore, only indirectly affect a player's power. This would say that a Robinson with an Oedipal complex does not have the strategy in his strategy set that results in him watching Wagner but a Robinson who merely finds Wagner boring does. Hence, the latter Robinson can be said to be more powerful than the former because he can do something that his alter ego cannot; but then again, the two Robinsons are, in reality, playing different games because they, in fact, have different strategy sets.
The point is plain. If we define power in a fundamental sense of 'a generic ability ' (capacity or potential) , which is what most, if not all, definitions of power (in a social context) do in some form or another, then the direct (assigning utility functions) or indirect (eliminating strategies from the strategy set) inclusion of i 's preferences or behavioural states in a measure of i 's power has some peculiar, if not absurd, conceptual consequences. We are reminded of a joke of Lewis Carroll's in his Sylvie and Bruno Concluded which is worth quoting in full:
'Well, how much have you learned, then?' 'I've learned a little tiny bit,' said Bruno, modestly, being evidently afraid of overstating his achievement. 'Can't learn no more!' 'Oh Bruno! You know you can if you like.' ' 'Course I can, if I like,' the pale student replied; 'but I can't if I don't like!'
What we wish to say with this quote is that to believe in preference-based power is to be like Bruno who no longer likes learning -because he no longer likes learning, he claims he cannot. To wit, Bruno has 'lost' his ability to learn because of his preference. In case it is thought that this conclusion is inapplicable to the more strategic n-person scenario, one should think again. We need only consider the reply of all the players bar c in the spatial MWC S 3 in Example 3.2 when asked if they have the ability to make their coalition a losing one (i.e. change the social outcome). 'No, sorry', they say, aping Bruno emphatically, 'we can't because we don't like' (¼ 'have been robbed of our swing'), despite the fact that should any one of them actually leave, the coalition would no longer be winning. This interpretive absurdity holds true for players b or c in Example 3.1 or, in fact, any index that is based on the notion of a spatial swing or pivot as such. Napel and Widgre´n's (2004) recent contribution is an example.
Dispositions and the Exercise Fallacy
The third, and possibly the most fundamental, reason for eschewing reference to i 's preferences in a measure of i 's power is related to the class of concepts to which power belongs. Conceived of as a 'potential', 'capacity', or 'ability' makes power a dispositional concept akin to terms such as 'soluble', 150 JOURNAL OF THEORETICAL POLITICS 17 (1) 'brittle', 'flammable', etc. 14 One of the basic characteristics of such a dispositional ascription is that it is categorical due to the fact that dispositions are independent of their manifestation or exercise. This immediately rules out the idea of spatial swings and pivots and even the idea of a preference or choice 'tremble' in the sense of Selten's (1975) perfectness concept that Napel and Widgre´n (2004) use in order to give members of an MWC who do not have a spatial pivot some power.
The point is not difficult to make. Simply put, a particular grain of salt remains soluble even if it never happens that it is immersed in a sufficient amount of water and for a sufficient period for it to dissolve. Likewise, the United States Congress has the power (ability) to pass bills vetoed by the President (by passing them with a two-thirds majority), even if the President never vetoes a bill. Thus, when we say that a player has the capacity to effect an outcome (or do certain things), we are stating that if given conditions obtain, then that player can effect the outcome (or do those things). In the case of voting games, if (1) a given coalition S obtains in a voting game and (2) S 2 WðÞ but S nfi g 6 2 WðÞ then (3) i has power in S because i has the capacity to see to it that S is winning or losing. Whether i will exercise this swing is dependent upon other factors (such as having a reason to do so, i.e. i's preferences). To use an almost marxian turn of phrase, power in the game theoretic setting (as against 'natural' powers to do things like my picking up a suitcase, throwing a rock etc.) is a 'structural capacity' and does not, therefore, wax and wane with its exercise. The inclusion of i 's preferences or behaviour in a measure of i 's power via spatial swings or pivots as in Example 3.2 or Selten-like trembles not only does not wash with the categorical nature of a dispositional ascription but it also conflates an ascription of the possession of a disposition (having power) with its exercise. This happens to be an instance of what is called the exercise fallacy (Morriss, 1987 (Morriss, /2002 .
Committing this fallacy is not to be taken lightly (even though it is prevalent in political science and some illustrious philosophers have committed it). 15 The problem is twofold:
institutional arrangements (rules of the game) and resources determine the distribution of power.
Epistemologically speaking, a power index that commits the exercise fallacy is an unreasonable index.
6. Digression: 'Power to' and 'Power Over'
Before tying up this essay, we have to make a brief digression to do away with a possible suspicion that the notion of power as a generic ability is not congruent with the notion of power used in Examples 3.1 and 3.2 that underpins the intuition of strategic power. In current terminology, power as a generic ability is what is called 'power to' or 'outcome power' while the examples we discuss are ostensibly based on the idea of 'power over' or 'social power'. 16 The difference is essentially that 'power to' concerns an actor's 'ability to bring about or help to bring about outcomes' (generic ability), while 'power over' concerns 'the ability of an actor to change the incentive structure of another actor or actors to bring about, or help bring about outcomes' (Dowding, 1991: 48) (i.e. 'power over' is an asymmetric relation between two or more actors). The case being argued for in these examples is that 'swings' are 'power to' and that this form of power does not entail 'power over', taken as the 'ability to extract concessions '. 17 In the light of this distinction, one might be tempted to conclude that the Core Theorem is valid for a 'power to' ascription but not for a 'power over' one (it is preference-based). We believe that this rather neat and simple conclusion is false on two accounts.
First, it is not true that there is a disjuncture between the 'power to' of the players and their ability to extract concessions in these examples. Consider once more Example 3.1, which is a game of imperfect information. Players b and c have a potential to extract concessions from a (have 'power over') on the grounds that if a makes an offer to b, not knowing the full history of the moves b might conclude that c has rejected a similar entreaty from a.
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JOURNAL OF THEORETICAL POLITICS 17 (1) 16. The distinction, which was originally made by Oppenheim (1961 Oppenheim ( , 1981 , is discussed in Morriss (1987 Morriss ( /2002 and Dowding (1991: 48-51) , from where the terms 'outcome power' and 'social power' come. The distinction can also be found in Brams and Affuso (1976) . A more recent and similar distinction in the voting power literature is that of Felsenthal and Machover's (1998) 'I-power' (power as influence) and 'P-power' (power as prize).
17. It should be fairly obvious, however, that 'power over' implies 'power to': A cannot extract any concessions from B (has 'power over') unless A has the 'power to' do, something to B that B cannot do to A (such as killing or wounding B ). Or in the context of voting games, dummies (null players) cannot extract concessions.
The corollary follows from the Core Theorem because by ignoring i 's preferences we are, from the perspective of i, restricted to the game form. In other words, and to again borrow a little marxist terminology, a valid power index is independent of the 'use value' of a player's ability. Ergo, when making a power ascription we must separate off discussions about the ability of an individual to do something -shape the state of affairs (which includes extracting a concessions) -from discussions about the value to an individual of this ability. We also take it that power is independent of a player's 'exchange value', as Hobbes already told us in Chapter X of Leviathan:
The Value, or Worth of a man, is as of all other things, his Price; that is to say, so much as would be given for the use of his Power: and therefore is not absolute; but a thing dependant on the need and judgement of another. An able conductor of Souldiers, is of great Price in time of War present, or imminent; but in Peace not so.
We do not dispute the obviously uncontroversial claim that the whole point of wanting or valuing power is to bring about outcomes that we like in much the same way as the whole point of wanting money is to buy things that make us happy. What we do dispute is that the 'use value' and 'exchange value' of my power is necessarily a proxy for my power. The fact that Hobbes' 'able conductor of Souldiers' commands a very low price in times of peace does not mean that he has lost his power to wage war. 20 Evidently, preferences are relevant for determining the value of power, for predicting what an agent may do with her power, or for relating it to concepts such as well-being; but from this it does not follow that preferences are necessary for the analysis of power per se.
As a coda to this essay we would like to mention two further points. First, if our Core Theorem is sound, then it transpires that we can head off any recrudescence of the usual criticisms trotted out against the framework of classical power indices that they ignore the preferences of the player whose power we wish to measure. Classical power indices satisfy the Core Theorem and its corollary because a simple game is actually a game form. In contrast, the notion of strategic power violates the Core Theorem and, hence, it cannot be taken to be saying anything intelligible about power in the fundamental sense of a 'generic ability'. 21 Second, there is a very significant methodological by-product and contentious issue of our analysis that needs explicating. By demonstrating that 154 JOURNAL OF THEORETICAL POLITICS 17 (1) 20. The 'power-value' distinction is another issue in the conceptual analysis of power that is still open. In a personal communication, Peter Morriss noted that no one has yet established the conditions under which there is a connection between power and value and what the nature of that connection is.
21. Our claim that classical power indices are in accordance with the Core Theorem does not mean we are suggesting that the power index sense of 'power' is the only correct use of the term.
power of a player is best analyzed in a non-preference-based framework, we challenge the default presupposition of economists that ignoring preferences is methodologically unsatisfactory. Like its sister concept of freedom, power does not sit comfortably with preferences. A notable parallel with the freedom literature is also the relatively recent switch from the preference-based social choice theoretic framework to the preference-free framework of game forms. 22 When studying power, we must always bear in mind that power is about events or potential outcomes themselves, not the utility attached to these outcomes.
We also hope that our analysis indicates that progress in the modelling and measurement of power requires an understanding of the conceptual issues involved. The present standoff between classical power indices and strategic power indices exists because a basic component of the debate has been missing.
